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Abstract 
Given the contemporary growth of ‘populist’ political parties and movements in a number of highly 
developed democratic states in Europe and North America, there has been a resurgence in academic 
interest around the various causes for the groundswell of support for political populism. Given this 
broader political context, this paper explores the interconnection between sport and populist politics 
in Hungary, with a particular emphasis on the appropriation of sport by ‘right-wing’ populist political 
actors. In particular, this paper will examine the politics–sport interconnection by discussing how the 
Prime Minister of Hungary, Victor Orbán, uses football, and sport more broadly, and the ways in which 
the Hungarian government have attempted to reinvent a strong nation and national identity through 
sport and related political populism. These attempts have been influenced by the interaction between 
forces of Westernisation and the country’s continuing post-communist transition, with the view to 
(re)inventing the Hungarian nation. 
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Introduction 
In light of the contemporary growth of ‘populist’ political parties and movements in a number of 
highly developed democratic states in Europe and North America, there has been a resurgence in 
academic interest around the various causes for the groundswell of support for political populism 
(Brubaker, 2019; Judis, 2016; Moffitt and Tormey, 2014; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012). A number of 
contemporary political developments in various international contexts have, thus, triggered a 
renewed emphasis on the importance of populist ideological positions. Such developments could 
include the election of President Donald Trump in the United States of America (Eiermann, 2016; 
Kazin, 2016; Kellner, 2016), the success of the ‘Leave’ campaign in the British referendum on 
European Union membership (Clarke and Newman, 2017; Freeden, 2017; Gusterson, 2017; Inglehart 
and Norris, 2016) and the unexpected popularity of the Brexit Party in the 2019 UK European 
Elections, and the emergence of secessionist nationalism movements in ‘stateless’ nations such as 
Scotland and Catalonia (Carbonell, 2018; Duerr, 2015; Guibernau, 2014; Keating, 1996). The 
mounting of populist politics within the European context is evidenced by the growth of ‘left-wing’ 
and ‘right-wing’ populist parties in Spain, Greece, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Hungary, amongst others (Mols and Jetten, 2016; Wodak, 2015; Wodak et al., 2013; Yilmaz, 2012). 
Whilst there are similarities as regards the reasons why populist political parties have come to the 
fore across Europe, there are also nation-based idiosyncrasies which need to be considered. For 
instance, Central and Eastern European countries have experienced dissimilar political, economic 
and cultural development trajectories in comparison with Western European ones. Nevertheless, in 
all of these regions of Europe, the growing presence of populist political parties is observable 
(https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36130006). Given this broader political context, in this 
paper we explore populist politics in Hungary, specifically the interconnection between sport and 
state, with a particular emphasis on the ‘use’ of sport by ‘right-wing’ populist political parties and 
key actors. Specifically, we will elaborate on political manoeuvres by Victor Orbán, Prime Minister of 
Hungary, with football, and sport, by analysing the ways in which the Hungarian government have 
attempted to reinvent a strong nation and national identity through sport and related political 
populism. Here we will argue that these attempts have been influenced by the interaction between 
forces of Westernisation and the country’s continuing post-communist transition. Our analysis is 
informed by existing research and mass media based evidence around key political and economic 
transitions which influence and have influenced the interconnection between sport, political 
populism and national identity in the Hungarian context. 
Whilst not executing a systematic review, we have conducted an extensive literature search similar 
to the procedures outlined in Dehghansai et al. (2017) to identify relevant academic sources by 
searching through databases such as SportDiscus, PubMed and Google Scholar. Having received 
ethical approval, we used the following search terms to identify key sources: ‘popular politics’, 
‘populism’, ‘popular politics and sport’, ‘popular politics and Hungary’, ‘populism and Hungary’, and 
‘Hungary and national identity and sport’. Based on the searches a large number of sources were 
identified, especially in the area of popular politics and populism. Consequently, we decided to only 
include sources that were written in English or in Hungarian, peer reviewed, and deemed key in 
relation to popular politics, Hungarian politics, and Hungarian sport and national identity. These 
sources construct the foundation of our analysis of popular politics, Hungary and sport. 
In addition to academic articles, we have also used a range of publicly accessible online mass media 
sources. To locate relevant web pages, we used Google in English and origo.hu in Hungarian with the 
following key words: ‘Hungarian sport and national identity’, ‘Hungarian sport and popular politics’, 
‘Hungarian sport and regime change’ and ‘Orbán and sport’. As the results of our searches were 
again extensive, we operationalised the results through use of a specific cut-off point, which was 
after the first 30 links listed by the respective search engines. Out of the sources that met the first 
criterion, we only included those which were: (a) directly relevant to the focus of the In addition to 
academic articles, we have also used a range of publicly accessible online mass media sources. To 
locate relevant web pages, we used Google in English and origo.hu in Hungarian with the following 
key words: ‘Hungarian sport and national identity’, ‘Hungarian sport and popular politics’, 
‘Hungarian sport and regime change’ and ‘Orbán and sport’. As the results of our searches were 
again extensive, we operationalised the results through use of a specific cut-off point, which was 
after the first 30 links listed by the respective search engines. Out of the sources that met the first 
criterion, we only included those which were: (a) directly relevant to the focus of the study; (b) 
publicly accessible; and (c) from well-established, credible organisations (e.g. official websites, 
government webpages, credible investigative reporting sites). The remaining sources we then put to 
a qualitative content analysis (see Bryman, 2015), specifically focusing on connections between 
politics, sport, football, Hungary and national identity. This content analysis, thus, provided the 
corpus of data and literature sources upon which we have based our discussion presented in the 
subsequent sections. 
The era of ‘populist’ politics? 
The growth of ‘populism’ within politics has rapidly become a central consideration for 
contemporary political analysts, with significant attention devoted to it in political sciences and 
broader public political debates. Whilst there is general agreement around populism’s recent 
significant upsurge, a number of debates have emerged regarding its specific nature and the causal 
factors leading to its growth (Bonikowski et al., 2018). Bonikowski et al. (2018: 1) argued that 
populism can take: 
...many forms, spanning continents and cutting across left–right lines. It is often used to describe 
both parties of the right... that oppose immigration and seek to restore national sovereignty; and of 
the left... that pit the people against an exploitative economic elite. 
Whilst Bonikowski et al. (2018) successfully expressed certain shared understandings of populism, 
there remains a disjuncture in their theorisations around both its causes and nature, indicating the 
need to consider country-specific socio-political idiosyncrasies reflective of the ‘impure’ nature of 
populism (Brubaker, 2019). 
In terms of the growth of populism, a number of arguments have emerged. There is agreement that 
the recent successes of populism are a by-product of the 2007–2008 global financial crisis and a 
reaction to the subsequent socio-economic challenges triggered by global neoliberal economic 
policies and deregulations (Gusterson, 2017; Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Salmela and Von Schave, 
2017). However, public reaction to the failures of this neoliberal system did not shift the electorate 
towards the established ideological ‘left’. Instead, populist parties exploited public resentment of 
rising multiculturalism to blame the immigrant ‘other’ following the 2007–2008 financial crisis, 
rather than neoliberal economic policies which had preceded it (Bonikowski et al., 2018; Fernández-
García and Luengo, 2018; Gusterson, 2017; Milačić and Vuković, 2018; Salmela and Von Schave, 
2017; Rooduijn, 2015). In this regard, Salmela and Von Schave (2017: 587) suggest that: 
...individual-level emotional responses mediate between macro-level sociocultural and economic 
changes, such as globalization, modernization and economic deregulation, and the micro-level 
motivation to support right-wing populist parties... experienced in post-industrial societies can 
transmute through repressed shame into anger, resentment and hatred towards perceived 
‘enemies’ of the self ... 
Given growing public resentment to the immigrant ‘other’, many Western democracies have 
witnessed increased support for right-wing populism which is firmly aligned with ‘ethnic nationalism’ 
(Kohn, 1944). Such right-wing conceptualisations of nationalism place emphasis on collective 
nationalist sentiments based on shared ethnic and cultural foundations. This resonates with 
‘primordialist’ theorisations of the nation, stressing the cohesive importance of long-term historical 
roots linked to socio-biological factors such as ethnicity, bloodline and ‘cultural givens’ such as 
language, customs and ‘home’ territory (Geertz, 1973; Lefebvre, 1991; Van den Berghe, 1978). 
Similar arguments regarding the primacy afforded to these ‘ethnies’ are offered by an 
‘ethnosymbolist’ approach to nationalism (Smith, 1986, 2010). Here, the potential impact of the 
symbolic elements of nationalist cohesion are underpinned by the social, cultural, political and 
emotional attachment which emanates from identification with a particular ‘ethnie’ (Smith, 1986, 
2010), thus going beyond Kohn’s dichotomy. 
Another agreement regarding the nature of contemporary populist politics is the vilification of the 
elites (Bonikowski, 2017; Bonikowski et al., 2018; Fernández-García and Luengo, 2018; Moffitt and 
Tormey, 2014; Rooduijn, 2015). Bonikowski (2017: 184) argues the ‘specific elites targeted by 
populists vary depending on the populists’ ideological predilections’, which, therefore, explains the 
multifarious forms of populist movements which have emerged across the ‘left–right’ ideological 
spectrum. However, specific to right-wing political populism, the ‘elites’ who are held to account for 
societal and economic problems tend to be those who have espoused pro-immigration, pro-
globalisation and socially progressive policies, framing these policies as a pursuit of political self-
interest at the expense of the general public. This vilification of moral elites acts as one element of 
the ‘political style’ of contemporary populism (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014). Moffitt and Tormey 
(2014: 387) argue that a focus on the performative elements of populist politics ‘contextualises 
populism’s position in the contemporary ‘stylised’ political landscape and brings representation to 
the forefront of discussions about populism’, highlighting the self-presentation of populist politicians 
as an antidote to the over-stylised, established political actors. 
In sum, whilst ‘populism’ remains controversial within contemporary politics, a degree of agreement 
has emerged around it. Rooduijn (2015: 5–6) identifies four reasons for the electoral popularity of 
such parties in Western Europe: (a) nativist outlook; (b) tendency to be authoritarian; (c) less satisfied 
with politics; (d) Euroscepticism. However, before turning to whether these four reasons are equally 
applicable to the rise of ‘populism’ in Hungary, we outline some of the ways in which the 
interconnection between sport and populist politics have manifested themselves in numerous 
nations. 
 
Populism, nationalism, right-wing politics and sport 
Hoberman (1984) argued in his seminal text on the interconnection between sport and political 
ideology that sport was frequently used by political leaders and heads of states across the 
ideological spectrum to harness and buttress support for their particular vision of their ‘nation’. With 
specific reference to the Cold War era, in which Hoberman was writing, he noted that his work: 
...interprets the political cultures of sport as proxy warriors in a larger ideological conflict which has 
pitted Marxist dogma, in its variety, against its two historical adversaries: first, fascism, and then the 
postwar non-Communist bloc, which runs the gamut from quasi-fascist (anti-Marxist) dictatorships 
to the (anti-Marxist) liberal democracies. (Hoberman, 1984: 6) 
 
Whilst this conceptualisation of sportspeople as ‘proxy warriors’ clearly resonates with the 
ideological clash between ‘East’ and ‘West’ in sporting ‘mega-events’ such as the Olympic Games in 
the Cold War era (Grix, 2013; Peppard and Riordan, 1993; Roche, 2002), it has also possessed 
explanatory value for analysing the nature of the interconnection between sport, politics and the 
‘nation’ in various post-Cold War geographic contexts (Bowes and Bairner, 2018; Cashmore, 2005; 
Jedlicka, 2018; Merkel, 2009). The ability of sport to evoke nationalist sentiments and support 
amongst a nation’s population has, therefore, unsurprisingly not gone unnoticed by political leaders, 
autocratic or democratic alike. 
 
Turning attention more towards the interconnection between ‘right-wing’ political populism and 
sporting matters, it can be argued that a number of common patterns have emerged with regard to 
the exploitation of sport by politicians on the right. Given that these political actors tend to espouse 
the nativist, nationalist and authoritarian principles identified in Rooduijn’s (2015) account, sporting 
competitions on the international stage provide an opportunity for nationalist political actors to 
express support (or otherwise) for their nation’s sporting representatives, especially given the 
symbolic image they portray to the rest of the world (Allison, 2000; Bairner, 2001, 2015). 
Unsurprisingly, the political exploitation of a nation’s sporting success on the global stage by right-
wing politics is the most frequent manifestation of the sport–politics interconnection, with the 
victories of the nation’s athletes or teams framed as evidence of the superiority of that nation’s 
people or political ideology (Hoberman, 1984).  
 
Oft-cited examples of the exploitation of sport by right-wing, fascist regimes include Hitler’s use of 
the 1936 Berlin Olympics (Houlihan, 1994; Mandell, 1971) and the exploitation of football by 
Mussolini’s fascist regime in Italy (Kassimeris, 2011b; Scalia, 2009). Similar tactics have also been 
adopted by more recent authoritarian and/or right-wing nationalist political leaders, ranging from 
those who champion sporting successes to foster nationalist sentiments such as the example of 
Tudjman in post-Yugoslav era Croatia (Brentin, 2013, 2016; Sack and Suster, 2000; Vrcan, 2002) 
through to the public denouncement of sporting failures which are blamed on the impact of ‘migrant 
players’ by right-wing politicians, as has been seen in the French context in the actions of Jean-Marie 
Le Pen’s National Front (Kassimeris, 2011a; Marks, 1998). 
 
Switching attention from the international to the domestic level of political operation, sport’s mass 
appeal within a given nation also presents an opportunity for politicians to bolster their electoral 
support. In the European context, the primary vehicle for domestic political appropriation is football, 
with the pre-existence of strong fan cultures and identities for football clubs offering scope for 
political actors to align their political beliefs with those influential fan groups (Hadas, 2000; 
Kassimeris, 2011b; Scalia, 2009; Thangaraj et al., 2018). For example, Scalia’s (2009) analysis of the 
interconnection between football and politics in Italy contends that football clubs have been used by 
contemporary Italian politicians as a ‘branch of their patronage machine’ (2009: 48), which for some 
clubs has led to an alignment with extreme right-wing political causes. More recently, the English 
context has also witnessed the rise of right-wing political movements such as the Democratic 
Football Lads Alliance which have spawned from football fan cultures (Thangaraj et al., 2018). 
 
Therefore, whilst such interaction between sport and right-wing politics is present in a range of 
countries across Europe, we argue that the connection between those social institutions is both 
traditional and extensive, and recently rejuvenated in Hungary. Given this, we turn our attention to 
this country’s recent history, i.e. post-communist transition, to foreground Victor Orbán’s 
appropriation of sport. 
 
Hungary’s post-communist political transition 
Hungary, a country geographically located in the centre of Europe, has had a turbulent past (Lendvai, 
2003), which still has bearing on its current socio-cultural, economic and political development. 
Arguably one of the most significant recent changes has been the country getting rid of the Soviet 
yoke and returning to the fold of Western democracy. Soviet influence over Hungary began to 
decrease in the late 1980s, a precursor to the collapse of the ‘Iron Curtain’ in 1989. Åslund (1999) 
noted that the failing Soviet system left its annexed countries in multiple uncertainties which had to 
be remedied. However, the downfall of the Soviet Union also provided opportunities for global 
(re)integration (Földes and Inotai, 2001; Mátyás, 2002; Molnar, 2006), which, in turn, helped new 
frameworks and reforms emerge (Molnar et al., 2011). As a result, Hungary experienced extensive 
society-wide changes, including the return of democratic elections and a multi-party political system. 
The first post-communist democratic elections took place on 25 March 1990 with the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum (MDF) securing dominance and forming a coalition government with the Christian 
Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) and the Independent Smallholder’s Party (FGKP). Whilst liberal 
voices, such as the Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ), were supported by some of the votes, the 
majority of the people favoured conservative, nationalist parties. As financial instability continued in 
all areas of Hungary in the 1990s (Meusburger, 2001), people began to lose faith in the new system 
and government, leading to the return of the reformed communist party (Hungarian Socialist Party – 
MSZP), which won the second elections on 8 May 1994 and formed a coalition government with the 
Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). These elections were a bitter disappointment for FIDESZ, which 
created an intra-party struggle, triggering a significant political shift away from liberal ideas towards 
conservative and nationalist sentiments. Whilst MSZP retained most of its popularity during its 
mandate, the 1998 elections saw the rise of the reformed, now more conservative, FIDESZ, which won 
the most seats in the Hungarian parliament and formed a coalition government with MDF and FGKP. 
Despite three different governments between 1990 and 2002, economic instability remained 
significant in Hungary. According to a survey carried out in 2000 (cited in Molnar, 2011), 82% of the 
respondents had had higher living standards during the communist era than in the new democracy. 
Economic instability began to create a politically divided Hungary, with MSZP and FIDESZ being the 
two dominant parties. This division was reflected in the outcome of the 2002 elections, in which 
FIDESZ could retain its majority in the House of Parliament, but MSZP managed to form government 
by establishing a coalition with SZDSZ. The MSZP–SZDSZ coalition government proved strong and 
retained its majority in the 2006 general elections when they became the first government to be re-
elected in Hungary since the collapse of communism. However, the confidential, post-election party 
congress speech by the MSZP leader, Ference Gyurcsány, was leaked to the public, triggering 
pronounced nation-wide controversy and protests. The infamous speech is referred to as the ‘Őszöd 
Speech’ and at that time grabbed both the domestic and international mass media’s attention given 
the brutally direct political remarks made by Gyurcsány 
(www.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/5359546.stm). 
The Őszöd Speech was the beginning of the decline of the MSZP and, more importantly, the rise of 
FIDESZ. In addition to the scandal surrounding Prime Minster Gyurcsány, Hungary did not fare well 
economically in the second half of the 2000s as that period experienced the economic crisis 
commencing in 2008 (Molnar and Doczi, in press). A combination of political outrage and economic 
instability led to the landslide 2010 general election victory for FIDESZ, which the party referred to as 
a ‘revolution at the polls’ (Palonen, 2012: 931). This victory mandated for large-scale transformations 
in Hungary due to the two-thirds majority possessed by the governing coalition parties, sufficiently 
large for constitutional changes. The new constitution changed the official name of the country from 
the Hungarian Republic to Hungary, revealing an inclination to create a borderless nation of 
Hungarians, aiming for the inclusion of Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring countries (Palonen, 
2012). The FIDESZ government have maintained its efforts to strengthen the Magyar1 nation inside 
and outside of Hungary’s borders. Sport, especially football, became a dominant tool for Victor Orbán 
to flex his nationalist muscles and retain his popularity over three consecutive general elections. 
 
Sport in post-communist Hungarian politics: FIDESZ’s growing influence 
The relationship between politics and sport in the early years of the post-communist era was random 
and sporadic. It has been argued that sport probably lost most of its political significance as the general 
public became aware of its political appropriation by the communist regime, which made politicians 
of the 1990s cautious (Molnar, 2007). A trend was also observed regarding politicians publicly 
expressing a disinterest in sport to demarcate themselves from communist political agendas (Molnar, 
2007). Interestingly, FIDESZ departed from this attitude and during its first coalition government 
(1998–2002) showed active involvement in sport, specifically football development. In many ways, 
FIDESZ’s strategic use of sport for political ends therefore simply mirrored the wider trend within this 
period in other developed and developing nations in Europe outlined above (Brentin, 2013, 2016; 
Kassimeris, 2011a, 2011b; Marks, 1998; Sack and Suster, 2000; Vrcan, 2002). For instance, a 
professional football league was launched in the 1999–2000 season, a state-funded football grassroots 
development was created, a football Stadia Reconstruction Programme was initiated (Molnar et al., 
2011), and the Minister of Youth and Sport at that time, Tamás Deutsch, actively interfered with the 
internal affairs of the Hungarian Football Association (Hoffer and Thaly, 2000). To what extent FIDESZ’s 
strong connection to sport helped or impaired the party’s political position and progress in the 1990s 
and early 2000s is moot; nonetheless, its first administration is a clear indication of its political 
approach to deploying sport for its own purposes and also is a harbinger of the post-2010 
interconnections between sport and politics in Hungary. 
 
FIDESZ regained political power in 2010 and has held onto it ever since. During this period several 
radical reforms across the country were introduced, showing intent to centralise and control strategic 
areas, such as the energy industry, education and media. The new regime, named the System of 
National Cooperation, developed a scheme to work together against the challenges posed by 
globalisation, Westernisation and the ongoing economic crisis (Molnar and Doczi, in press). The 
reactionary nature of these protectionist strategic reforms can be argued to resonate with broader 
arguments regarding the pre-cursors of populist political ideologies in European politics (Gusterson, 
2017; Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Salmela and Von Schave, 2017). The Orbán era of Hungarian politics 
echoes the sceptical arguments of many other parties on the ‘right’ of European politics regarding the 
threat to Hungarian sovereignty and economic development from the liberal policies of the European 
Union in relation to trade and immigration. It appears, therefore, that within that broader ideological 
approach, sport was identified as a key strategic sector to reinforce a distinctive sense of Hungarian 
identity as FIDESZ resumed its previous attempts to centralise and incorporate it into its politics. This 
meant that sport, football specifically, became a distinctive aspect of right-wing popular politics in 
Hungary and, in turn, the recipient of significant central investment (Ligeti and Mucsi, 2016). 
 
Arguably, there are two chief reasons as to why football has regained its political significance in the 
FIDESZ era: the personal and the political. On a personal level, the leader of FIDESZ and Prime Minister 
of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, is and has been a passionate football fan and player. He even continued to 
play semi-professional football in Felcsút for a fourth-division team during his first reign as Prime 
Minister. As was the case for Italy’s ex-Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi through his past ownership of 
one of Italy’s leading football clubs, A.C. Milan (Kassimeris, 2011b; Scalia, 2009), Orbán’s pre-existing 
association with football can, therefore, be argued to have offered him a unique opportunity to 
present himself to the Hungarian electorate as a politician with the ‘common touch’. This positioning 
of football as an important element of Hungarian popular culture is a valuable attribute for the 
effective populist political actor who wishes to distance their public persona from the political, 
intellectual and institutional elites, against which populist political parties often rail (Bonikowski, 2017; 
Bonikowski et al., 2018; Fernández-García and Luengo, 2018; Moffitt and Tormey, 2014; Rooduijn, 
2015). Orbán’s frequent Eurosceptic, anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalism rhetoric is evidence 
of right-wing populist political tendencies (Harris, 2017). 
 
Orbán’s personal connection to Felcsút saw the small town receiving an economic boost in the form 
of a football stadium, the Pancho Arena. This development is part of Orbán’s aspiration to improve 
the quality of Hungarian football and restore the golden days of the Magic Magyars (Goldblatt and 
Nolan, 2018). This 3812-capacity, luxury-grade stadium cost around €12.2m and is located near a town 
with a population of approximately 1800 – an unorthodox location for a football arena of this scale at 
twice the capacity of its host town. Given this, Ligeti and Mucsi (2016) argue that football stadia 
construction is one of the main ways in which public money unaccountably disappears in Orbán-era 
Hungary. The Felcsút football club is the case in point as it received €30m central funding between 
2011 and 2014 out of a €240m budget that was to be shared across more than 1100 clubs (Ligeti and 
Mucsi, 2016). In addition to centrally funded football development, Orbán also regularly comments 
on the sport and related results in state-sponsored mass media and perceives Hungarians to be a 
football-smart nation. Another example of the football–politics connection is the celebratory 
government voices that were present when, after a 30-year gap in international football 
achievements, the Hungarian national team qualified for the 2016 European Championship (Molnar 
and Doczi, in press). Such explicit attempts to associate the successes of Hungary’s footballing 
representatives with the nation’s political leadership, thus, continues a long-established pattern from 
political leaders who wish to gain political capital from sport (Allison, 2000; Bairner, 2001, 2015; 
Hadas, 2000; Hoberman, 1984; Houlihan, 1994). 
 
As a consequence of being identified as a key strategic political sector, sport, and football specifically, 
was granted unprecedented state support. Ligeti and Mucsi (2016: 117) list the number and volume 
of football stadia investments by the Hungarian government since 2010. The FIDESZ government have 
spent over €100m on such investments. The need for this level of investment is particularly 
questionable as, despite new stadia, the Nemzeti Sport [National Sport] (2014) newspaper reported 
that match attendance numbers were dwindling. Other sport facilities have also been (re)constructed, 
which coincides with the government’s aim to stage sporting mega-events and major international 
events, such as the World Aquatics Championships, the European Football Championships, the World 
Athletics Championships, and the Summer Olympic Games (Molnar and Doczi, in press). Moreover, in 
2015 a state-funded television channel was launched dedicated to broadcasting sports, specifically 
covering events where Hungarian athletes participate. These are all examples of continuously 
increasing state influence of and interference with sport, especially football (see Goldblatt and Nolan, 
2018). Based on the above examples, it is safe to say that the current government, and Orbán leading 
it, have been redistributing public funds as they see fit, with sport acting as a medium for achieving 
specific political goals with limited (and sometimes muted) public outcry given the popular (and 
populist) nature of sport in Hungarian culture. 
 
‘Defender of the homeland’: reinventing the Magyars through football in Orbán’s Hungary 
Perhaps due to the above-described events and political actions, Harris (2017) observes that in 
Central Europe Hungary has the lowest democratic score and declares it appropriate that Jean-
Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission, greeted the Hungarian prime minister in 
Riga in May 2015 by saying ‘Hello, dictator’. Whilst it may initially appear harsh to call Orbán a 
dictator, US Senator John McCain had referred to him as such a year earlier 
(https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-usa-idUSKCN0JH1EW20141203), and on closer 
inspection some of the actions of his administration may qualify for that title. Broadly speaking, 
Orbán views immigration and liberal/multicultural EU policies as threats to the Hungarian nation, 
and has, therefore, implemented a range of actions to ‘protect’ the Magyars, including changing the 
Hungarian constitution multiple times, catering for the needs of the Hungarian oligarchs, declaring 
his aims to build an ‘illiberal state’ and, perhaps most importantly, portraying himself as the 
‘defender’ of Hungary. 
Interestingly and importantly, the self-proclaimed ‘defender of the Homeland’ rhetoric expressed by 
Orbán and his political entourage does not exclusively refer to the Hungarian nation within its 
existing borders, but to the greater, pre-Trianon (1920) Kingdom of Hungary. The Hungarian 
Spectrum (2018) notes that post-communist governments ‘pledged Hungary’s acceptance of the 
present borders, but Viktor Orbán is retreating from that position’. In other words, Orbán envisions 
the Hungarian nation in its pre-Trianon form with all the lost territories (re)attached. He adopts an 
irredentist stance on the matter to re-connect Magyars inside and outside of Hungary and football, 
in particular, has become an institute through which all Magyars may be (re)united. 
Here it is worth noting that irredentism and post-Trianon Hungary go hand-in-hand. The end of the 
Great War and the outcome of the consequent peace negotiations dissolved the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire and greatly reduced both the population and geographic size of Hungary. Beiner (2013: 41) 
observes that the late arriving Hungarian delegation was served a document ‘fait accompli’. In 
particular Part II of the document (Frontiers of Hungary) ‘stipulated that the Kingdom of Hungary 
was to lose approximately 70% of its former territory and, according to their reckoning, almost a 
third of its ethnic Hungarian population (3.3 million out of 10.7 million) to six neighbouring 
countries’. This historic decimation of Hungary both as a country and a nation left deep scars in the 
Hungarian psyche (Várdy, 1997). This feeling of national resentment was somewhat oppressed 
during the communist era as it was considered ‘as the product of imperialism, serving bourgeois and 
landowner interests’ (Beiner, 2013: 42). However, in the new democracy such nationalistic 
sentiments resurfaced with gusto and Orbán harnessed them to serve his political ends. 
The reunification efforts through sport are a sign of Orbán’s recognition of sport’s socio-cultural 
significance in Hungary and in the construction of Hungarian national identity. For instance, through 
a survey-based study, Örkény (2005) demonstrated that in both 1995 and 2003 sport achievements 
were one of the highest sources of national pride in Hungary, significantly exceeding other 
categories such as the economy, social security and democracy. Pertinent to our arguments on sport 
here, Örkény (2005: 40) also noted that ‘those who run for a nationalist movement and popular 
sport should appeal, first of all, to people’s ethnocentric dispositions’. This connection between 
Hungarian national identity and pride is astutely recognised by the Orbán regime. However, for 
Orbán, national identity often shifts to regional identity as a way of demarcating himself, the 
Hungarian nation and the wider region from the ‘oppressive’ European Union. Csehi (2019: 1016), 
based on an analysis of Orbán’s speeches, observes that for Orbán ‘the corrupt elite’ was 
increasingly equated with ‘European bureaucrats’. Consequently, the Prime Minister has been 
fostering a regional identity which shifted from calling on the people of Hungary, to Hungarians 
(Magyars), and then to ‘Central Europeans’. Csehi (2019: 1017) argues that the ‘constant 
reinterpretation of “the people” with newer and newer layers of identity was carried out to ensure 
stable, or even increased mobilization behind his political agenda’. 
In relation to football, Orbán’s reunification efforts have manifested through substantial state 
support for football academies inside and outside of the country’s borders where Hungarian 
minorities reside, including Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia (Bence, 2018). 
This shows a clear intention to symbolically unite Hungarians across national borders through 
football. The Hungarian Spectrum (2018) referred to these efforts of the government as creating 
‘extraterritorial football facilities as the glue of national cohesion’. Oroszi and Sipos (2018) unfolded 
the Orbán government’s investments into the construction of footballing facilities outside of 
Hungary’s borders and have identified that between 2013 and 2018 there was an approximately 
HUF16b (€50m) expenditure. These efforts are in line with the aforementioned recent constitutional 
change to the official name of the country from Hungarian Republic to Hungary. Football’s role in 
these nation (re)building endeavours has been to become a platform through which all Magyars 
living in and outside of Hungary may unite. 
To this end, whilst the Orbán government’s extra-territorial sporting investments may be easily 
interpreted as nothing more than regional diplomacy or a form of ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig, 1995), 
we contend that those activities are of greater importance in relation to the reconstruction of a 
conceptualisation of a Hungarian nation which invokes ethnically rooted, ‘hot’ forms of nationalism 
(Hutchinson, 2006). In other words, it can be argued that the re-emergence of irredentist attitudes 
in post-communist Hungary have been harnessed by the Orbán administration to create a form of 
sports policy with the view to reinvent a post-communist, Western Hungary. This strategic approach, 
thus, can be argued to resemble a form of Hungarian cultural imperialism in the Carpathian Basin, 
aiming to portray Hungary as a ‘football-smart nation’ with a reach beyond its geographic borders to 
unite all ethnic Hungarians, thereby (re)vitalising a national identity that has been continuously 
oppressed, bruised, and challenged in the 20th century and beyond (Molnar and Doczi, in press; 
Várdy, 1997; Várdy and Várdy, 1989). The words of Orbán himself at the grand opening of the MOL 
Football Academy in Dunajská Streda, Slovakia in 2018 explicate our contentions regarding the 
symbolic significance of these strategic foreign investments in sporting infrastructure as an ethnically 
derived form of ‘hot nationalism’ uniting ethnic Hungarians across existing state borders: 
I would like to make it clear – without pathos or pomp – that, now and in the future, the people of 
Dunaszerdahely and the Hungarians of Felvidék [the Hungarian-populated region of Slovakia] can 
rely on Hungary, on the Hungarian government, and on me personally... we should be happy that 
Hungarians beyond the borders and Hungarians at home have found one another, and are capable 
of building and creating things together not only at home, but also beyond the borders... Sport is an 
excellent link between the peoples and countries of the Carpathian Basin – and therefore also 
between Hungary and Slovakia (Hungarian Government 2018)  
Concluding thoughts 
In this article we have focused on the gradual emergence of popular politics across Europe, and have 
provided a brief summary of some of the relevant and bourgeoning literature to foreground our 
discussion of the specific manifestation of populist politics in the domain of Hungarian sport and 
society. We argued that while a degree of dissonance remains in contemporary politically inclined 
research as regards to how to specifically define and interpret popular politics, some common trends 
are observable. However, we deem it essential to explore popular politics and populist political 
parties in action within their own socio-cultural settings. 
To unpack some of the existing tendencies of right-wing populist political parties, we focused on 
Hungary and the current Hungarian government’s ever increasing presence in sport, specifically 
football. We have contended that the FIDESZ-led administration deviated from previous post-
communist practices in terms of their relation to sport and football development. In fact, we argue 
that since 2010, the beginning of the FIDESZ era, significant changes have taken place across 
Hungary and Hungarian sport. Sport has become part of the government’s strategic plan, in which 
football in particular has gained a significant role. We explained that football’s centrality has derived 
from two reasons: personal and political. Personal reasons included the long-term, active football 
involvement of Victor Orbán who has invested millions of euros into football stadia development 
(most of which are highly controversial), endeavouring to bring back the golden days of the ‘Magical 
Magyars’ in order to successfully re-frame Hungary as a ‘football smart nation’. 
The political reasons, not disconnected from the personal, centre more around issues regarding the 
Hungarian nation and national identity. Given that Hungary’s turbulent history and the 
consequences of World War I peace negotiations have remained in the Magyar national psyche, but 
were suppressed during the communist period, the post-Iron Curtain democratic era has given rise 
to irredentist sentiments across the nation. We argued that the Orbán government has harnessed 
them for its own political ends. In this arrangement, Orbán has been portrayed as the ‘Defender of 
the Homeland’ whereby he is there to protect Hungary as a country and to unite all Magyars in and 
outside of the country. In this irredentist endeavour, football and related investments have become 
a key political tool for the government, which has made a number of significant foreign investments 
in building stadia and other football facilities in areas that used to belong to the pre-Trianon 
Kingdom of Hungary. 
In this light, we argue that these activities of the government can be seen as a form of 
reconstruction of a conceptualisation of a Hungarian nation which invokes ethnically rooted, ‘hot’ 
forms of nationalism and a primordial perception of nationhood. This approach aims to remedy and 
(re)vitalise a Magyar national identity as a strategic response to the multitude of contemporary 
challenges that span from economic uncertainties, European Union-based centralism and mass-
migration-triggered national fears. However, as similar right-wing populist movements continue to 
gain momentum across other European nations in response to these contemporary global 
challenges, what remains to be seen is the extent to which these endeavours by Orbán’s 
government do indeed bear fruit in terms of Hungary’s economic, social and political development 
within the tumultuous political climate which is impacting upon the supra-national project of the 
European Union. 
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Notes 
Although Hungarian and Magyar often used interchangeably, here we use the term ‘Magyar’, 
especially ‘Magyars’ to refer to Hungarians inside and outside of the geographic area of Hungary. 
See details at: https://index.hu/sport/futball/2018/01/09/20_milliard_felett_hataron_tuli_ 
labdarugas_magyar_allami_tamogatas/ and http://www.nemzetisport.hu/egyeb_egyeni/ 
sportpolitika-ime-a-kormany-ev-vegi-sportcelu-tamogatasai-2676037 
 
ReferencesAllison L (2000) Sport and nationalism. In: Coakley J and Dunning E (eds) Handbook of 
Sports Studies. London: SAGE, 344–355. 
Åslund A (1999) Post-communist economic transformations. In: Braun A and Barany Z (eds) Dilemmas 
of Transition: The Hungarian Experience. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 69–88. 
Bairner A (2001) Sport, Nationalism and Globalization: European and North American Perspectives. 
Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Bairner A (2015) Assessing the sociology of sport: On national identity and nationalism. International 
Review for the Sociology of Sport 50(4–5): 375–379. 
Beiner G (2013) ‘No, nay, never’ (once more): The resurrection of Hungarian irredentism. History 
Ireland 21(3): 40–43. 
Bence J (2018) Két év alatt 20 milliárd forint ment el határon túli futballra [Over two years 20 billion 
HUF spent on football across the borders]. Index. 
Available at: 
https://index.hu/sport/futball/2018/01/09/20_milliard_felett_hataron_tuli_labdarugas_magyar_
allami_tamogatas/ Accessed on: 21/11/2019. 
Billig M (1995) Banal Nationalism. London: SAGE. 
Bonikowski, B (2017) Ethno-nationalist populism and the mobilization of collective resentment. 
The British Journal of Sociology 68(S1): S181–S213. 
Bonikowski B, Halikiopoulou D, Kaufmann E, et al. (2018) Populism and nationalism in a comparative 
perspective: A scholarly exchange. Nations and Nationalism 25(1): 58–81. 
Bowes A and Bairner A (2018) England’s proxy warriors? Women, war and sport. International Review 
for the Sociology of Sport 53(4): 393–410. 
Brentin D (2013) ‘A lofty battle for the nation’: The social roles of sport in Tudjman’s Croatia. Sport in 
Society 16(8): 993–1008. 
Brentin D (2016) Ready for the homeland? Ritual, remembrance and political extremism in Croatian 
football. Nationalities Papers 44(6): 860–876. 
Brubaker R (2019) Populism and nationalism. Nations and Nationalism. Epub ahead of print 29 April. 
DOI: 10.1111/nana.12522.  
Bryman A (2015) Social Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Carbonell J-M (2018) The two main challenges to Catalan identity. American Behavioral Scientist 63(7): 
789–806. 
Cashmore E (2005) Making Sense of Sports. London: Routledge. 
Clarke J and Newman J (2017) ‘People in this country have had enough of experts’: Brexit and the 
paradoxes of populism. Critical Policy Studies 11(1): 101–116. 
Csehi R (2019) Neither episodic, nor destined to failure? The endurance of Hungarian populism after 
2010. Democratization 26(6): 1011–1027. 
Dehghansai N, Lemez S, Wattie N, et al. (2017) A systematic review of influences on development of 
athletes with disabilities. Adapted Physical Activity Quarterly 34(1): 72–90. 
Duerr G (2015) Secessionism and the European Union: The Future of Flanders, Scotland and Catalonia. 
London: Lexington. 
Eiermann M (2016) How Donald Trump fits into the history of American populism. New Perspectives 
Quarterly 33(2): 29–34. 
Fernández-García B and Luengo OG (2018) Populist parties in Western Europe: An analysis of the three 
core elements of populism. Communication & Society 31(3): 57–76. 
Földes G and Inotai A (eds) (2001) A Globlalizáció Kihívásai és Magyarország [The Challenges of 
Globalisation and Hungary]. Budapest: Napvilág. 
Freeden M (2017) After the Brexit referendum: Revisiting populism as an ideology. Journal of Political 
Ideologies 22(1): 1–11. 
Geertz C (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures. London: Fontana. 
Goldblatt D and Nolan D (2018) The Hungarian prime minister has been lavishing public money on his 
favourite sport for years: Could it be his undoing? The Guardian, 11 January. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jan/11/viktor-orban-hungary-prime-minister-reckless-
football-obsession. Accesed: 21/11/19 
Grix J (2013) Sport politics and the Olympics. Political Studies Review 11(1): 15–25. 
Guibernau M (2014) Prospects for an independent Catalonia. International Journal of Politics, Culture, 
and Society 27(1): 5–23. 
Gusterson H (2017) From Brexit to Trump: Anthropology and the rise of nationalist populism. 
American Ethnologist 44(2): 209–214. 
Hadas M (2000) Football and social identity: The case of Hungary in the twentieth century. Sport in 
History 20(2): 43–66. 
Harris E (2017) Democracy is on the brink in Hungary, so why is no one talking about it? The 
Independent, 10 August. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/long_reads/ 
democracy-is-on-the-brink-in-hungary-so-why-is-no-one-talking-about-it-a7883876.html. 
Accesed: 21/11/19 
Hoberman JM (1984) Sport and Political Ideology. Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Hoffer J and Thaly Z (2000) A Magyar Labdarúgó Szövetség története [History of the Hungarian 
Football Association]. In: Thaly Z (ed.) 100 éves a Magyar Labdarúgó Szövetség, 1901-2000 [The 
Hungarian Football Association is 100 Years Old, 1901-2000]. Budapest: Folpress Kft, 15–52. 
Houlihan B (1994) Sport and International Politics. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Hungarian Government (2018) Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s speech at the inauguration of the MOL 
Football Academy. Available at: https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-
minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-inauguration-of-the-mol-
football-academy. Accessed: 10/1/19 
Hungarian Spectrum (2018) Irredentist Trianon Monument and Religious Trappings of August 20. 
Available at: http://hungarianspectrum.org/2018/08/20/irredentist-trianon-monument-and-
religious-trappings-of-august-20/. Accessed: 10/09/19 
Hutchinson J (2006) Hot and banal nationalism: The nationalization of the masses. In: Delanty G and 
Kumar K (eds) The SAGE Handbook of Nations and Nationalism. London: SAGE, 295–306. 
Inglehart R and Norris P (2016) Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: Economic have-nots and 
cultural backlash. HKS Working Paper No. RWP-16026. Available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2818659 
Jedlicka SR (2018) Sport governance as global governance: Theoretical perspectives on sport in the 
international system. International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 10(2): 287–304. 
Judis JB (2016) The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European 
Politics. New York: Columbia Global Reports. 
Kassimeris C (2011a) Black, blanc and beur: French football’s ‘foreign legion’. Journal of Intercultural 
Studies 32(1): 15–29. 
Kassimeris C (2011b) Fascism, separatism and the ultràs: discrimination in Italian football. Soccer & 
Society 12(5): 677–688. 
Kazin M (2016) Trump and American populism: Old whine, new bottles. Foreign Affairs 95: 17. 
Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-10-06/trump-and-
american-populism. Accessed: 10/09/19 
Keating M (1996) Nations against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and 
Scotland. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Kellner D (2016) American Nightmare: Donald Trump, Media Spectacle, and Authoritarian Populism. 
Boston: Sense Publishers. 
Kohn H (1944) The Idea of Nationalism. New York: Macmillan. 
Lefebvre H (1991) The Production of Space. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Lendvai P (2003) The Hungarians: 1000 Years of Victory in Defeat. London: Hurst & Company. 
Ligeti M and Mucsi G (2016) Opening the door to corruption in Hungary’s sport financing. In: 
Transparency International: Global corruption report: Sport. Available at: 
https://www.transparency.org/files/content/feature/1.12_OpeningTheDoor_LigetiMucsi_GCRSpo
rt.pdf. Accesed: 21/11/19 
Mandell R (1971) The Nazi Olympics. New York: Macmillan. 
Marks J (1998) The French national team and national identity: ‘Cette France d’un “bleu métis”’. 
Culture, Sport, Society 1(2): 41–57. 
Mátyás KJ (ed.) (2002) A Zárva Várt Nyugat: Kulturális Globalizáció Magyarországon [West Shut Open: 
Cultural Globalisation in Hungary]. Budapest: Sík Kiadó. 
Merkel U (2009) Sport, politics and reunification – A comparative analysis of Korea and Germany. The 
International Journal of the History of Sport 26(3): 406–428. 
Meusburger P (2001) The role of knowledge in the socio-economic transformation of Hungary in the 
1990s. In: Meusburger P and Jons H (eds) Transformations in Hungary: Essays in Economy and 
Society. New York: Physica-Verlag, 1–37. 
Milačić F and Vuković I (2018) The rise of the politics of national identity: New evidence from Western 
Europe. Ethnopolitics 175: 443–460. 
Moffitt B and Tormey S (2014) Rethinking populism: Politics, mediatisation and political style. Political 
Studies 62(2): 381–397. 
Molnar G (2006) Mapping migrations: Hungary related migrations of professional footballers after the 
collapse of communism. Soccer & Society 7(4): 463–485. 
Molnar G (2007) Hungarian football: A socio-historical perspective. Sport in History 27(2): 293–318. 
Molnar G (2011) From the Soviet Bloc to the European community: Migrating professional footballers 
in and out of Hungary. In: Maguire J and Falcous M (eds) Sport and Migration. London: Routledge, 
56–70. 
Molnar G and Doczi T (in press) Post-communist sport transformations in Hungary: A transitology 
informed approach. In: Rojo-Labaien E, Rodríguez-Díaz Á and Rookwood J (eds) Sport, Statehood 
and Transition in Europe: Comparative Perspectives from Post-Soviet and Post-Socialist Societies. 
London: Routledge 
Molnar G, Doczi T and Gal A (2011) A socio-structural overview of Hungarian football. In: 
Gammelsæter H and Senaux B (eds) The Organisation and Governance of Top Football Across 
Europe: An Institutional Perspective. London: Routledge, 253–267. 
Mols F and Jetten J (2016) Explaining the appeal of populist right-wing parties in times of economic 
prosperity. Political Psychology 37(2): 275–292. 
Mudde C and Kaltwasser CR (eds) (2012) Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective 
for Democracy? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Nemzeti Sport (2014) Hiába az új stadionok, az FTC-nél és az NB I-ben is csökkent a nézőszám [Despite 
new stadia, spectator numbers are decreasing at FTC and in NB I too]. Available at: 
www.nemzetisport.hu/labdarugo_nb_i/nezoszam-2381393. Accesed: 21/10/19 
Örkény A (2005) Hungarian national identity: Old and new challenges. International Journal of 
Sociology 35(4): 28–48. 
Oroszi B and Sipos Z (2018) Megszereztük, feldolgoztuk és nyilvánosságra hozzuk a határon túli 
fociakadémiák támogatásáról szóló szerződéseket [We have obtained, analysed and revealed the 
contracts regarding the support for the over the boarder football academies]. Átlatszó. Available 
at: https://atlatszo.hu/2018/12/11/megszereztuk-feldolgoztuk-es-nyilvanossagra-hozzuk-a-
hataron-tuli-fociakademiak-tamogatasarol-szolo-szerzodeseket/. Accesed: 21/10/19 
Palonen E (2012) Transition to crisis in Hungary: Whistle-blowing on the naked emperor. Politics & 
Policy 40(5): 930–957. 
Peppard V and Riordan J (1993) Playing Politics: Soviet Sport Diplomacy to 1992. London: JAI Press. 
Roche M (2002) Megaevents and Modernity: Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture. 
London: Routledge. 
Rooduijn M (2015) The rise of the populist radical right in Western Europe. European View 14: 3–11. 
Sack A and Suster Z (2000) Soccer and Croatian nationalism: A prelude to war. Journal of Sport and 
Social Issues 24(3): 305–320. 
Salmela M and Von Schave C (2017) Emotional roots of right-wing political populism. Social Science 
Information 56(4): 567–595. 
Scalia V (2009) Just a few rogues? Football ultras, clubs and politics in contemporary Italy. 
International Review for the Sociology of Sport 44(1): 41–53. 
Smith AD (1986) The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Smith AD (2010) Nationalism. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Thangaraj S, Ratna A, Burdsey D and Rand E (2018) Leisure and the racing of national populism. Leisure 
Studies 37(6): 648-661. 
Van den Berghe P (1978) Race and ethnicity: A sociobiological perspective. Ethnic and Racial Studies 
1(4): 401–411 
Várdy SB (1997) The Trianon syndrome in today’s Hungary. Hungarian Studies Review 24(1–2): 73–79. 
Várdy SB and Várdy HA (eds) (1989) The Austro-Hungarian Mind: At Home and Abroad. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Vrcan S (2002) The curious drama of the president of a Republic versus a football fan tribe: A 
symptomatic case in the post-communist transition in Croatia. International Review for the 
Sociology of Sport 37(1): 59–77. 
Wodak R (2015) The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean. London: SAGE. 
Wodak R, Khosravinik M and Mral B (eds) (2013) Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and 
Discourse. London: Bloomsbury. 
Yılmaz F (2012) Right-wing hegemony and immigration: How the populist far-right achieved hegemony 
through the immigration debate in Europe. Current Sociology 60(3): 368–381. 
 
 
 
